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In his lecture course on Nature, Merleau-Ponty makes the intriguing claim that an ontology of Nature is 
the preferred way toward ontology in general. This paper explores why he makes this claim and asks 
what philosophical significance this approach to ontology might have. Making use of Merleau-Ponty’s 
notions of chiasm and flesh as the must fundamental ontological truths, I argue that nature and history are 
related to one another according to the logic of the chiasm and that thinking them in terms of this 
relationship opens up avenues for addressing long-standing problems in both philosophy of nature and 
philosophy of history. Specifically, I explore Merleau-Ponty’s response to the problem of a scientific 
historical methodology that is distinct from the methodology of the natural sciences and suggest that his 
response, in its reliance on the logic of chiasm, moves the problem beyond the state it reached in the 




‘Nature as a leaf or layer of total Being – the ontology of Nature as the way toward 
ontology – the way that we prefer because the evolution of the concept of Nature is a 
more convincing propadeutic, [since it] more clearly shows the necessity of the 
ontological mutation. We will show how the concept of Nature is always the expression 
of an ontology – and its privileged expression.’ (Merleau-Ponty, Nature, 204) 
 
Why is the ontology of nature the way toward ontology in general? And why, in turn, is 
a history of the ‘evolution’ of nature as a philosophical concept the way toward the 
ontology of nature? This paper seeks to understand the significance of historical-
philosophical reflection on nature to Mearleau-Ponty’s ontology of the visible and 
invisible. The answer to this question lies in two ideas. First, if we assume the validity 
of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology as presented in The Visible and the Invisible, we find that 
a relation of chiasm obtains between nature and history. Second, if we think nature and 
history in terms of this relation, we find ourselves provided with a fruitful approach to 
apprehending the meaning of both.   
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The question that focuses Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophical work is that of chiasm as 
the fundamental ontological insight. We understand chiasm as ‘the self-mediating 
reconversion of transcendence and immanence’ (VI 90), as continual reversibility 
between what is given and what is not, the reflective and the unreflected, structure and 
signification, the visible and the invisible. The secret of being does not ultimately rest 
in the things which enter into this relation; in fact, this direction of thought leads to 
incoherence, it cannot provide a satisfactory account of things. One of the great lessons 
phenomenology has drawn from the history of philosophy is that the assumption of the 
primacy of things is flawed precisely because it is impossible to pin down what things 
are while at the same time operating under the assumption that being is centered in 
things. Instead, being rests in the movement of the chiasm, the way being folds back 
over itself and how, in the moment of its crossing, reveals a stuff that is neither material 
nor spiritual, but which Merleau-Ponty calls ‘flesh.’  
 
[F]lesh is an ultimate notion… …a relation of the visible with itself that traverses me 
and constitutes me as a seer, this circle which I do not form, which forms me, this 
coiling over of the visible upon the visible...’ (IV 140). Flesh is a meaning relation, but 
not an intellectual one. It is not matter, but neither is it thought, because it is a relation 
that involves tangibility and visibility. As an ultimate notion, the structure of flesh is 
also the structure underlying and manifested in the world and ourselves. What we 
perceive as things or objects are the coming to sensible expression of chiasmic 
intertwining; everything we encounter is somehow shot through with this relation. 
‘What exists are not present “things” or forces but systems of differential relationships 
in an ongoing process of integration, disintegration and reformulation’ (Toadvine 33).  
 
Given flesh, given these relational systems, how is ‘the concept of Nature’ related to 
ontology, and why might it be the ‘privileged expression?’ Why do we treat nature, and 
thus ontology, historically, through studying the evolution of the concept? These are the 
questions which find their answers in the chiasm between nature and history. We must 
begin by seeing what Merleau-Ponty means by ‘Nature.’ One of the implications of the 
idea of flesh is that meaning does not require sentience before it can exist; rather, it can 
exist beneath thought. There is unreflected meaning that lies within the sensible, 
constituting the sensible. This unreflected meaning is the starting point for 
understanding nature. ‘Nature is what has a meaning without this meaning being 
posited by thought’ (Nature 3).  
 
It is also what underlies all of our experiences of perception, reflection, etc. Expanding 
on a remark of Husserl’s in ‘Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological 
Origin of the Spatiality of Nature,’ Merleau-Ponty distinguishes ‘the Earth’ as a horizon 
within which we are given everything else. It is the ‘soil of our experience’ (Husserl’s 
words), ‘not an object among other objects but the living stock from which the objects 
are engendered’ (Nature 77). As an overarching concept or horizon of experience, 
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nature is ‘a carrier of all the possible’ (Nature 77), an entity that is the originary source 
of any sentient reflection concerning it.  
 
The meaningful sensible of nature must then exceed any attempts to reflect upon it, 
because it is both the point from which we begin and that toward which reflection is 
oriented. This aspect of nature captures the trait of simultaneous transcendence and 
immanence which first Husserl and then Merleau-Ponty understood as an essential 
characteristic of all perception (and, consequently, reflection, as it arises from 
perception). Sentient reflection on nature is ‘ontologically continuous’ with nature, 
springing as it does from the ‘soil,’ the ‘Earth,’ and yet, the ‘unreflective – in a word, 
nature – remains for the personal self a prehistory, an irrecuperable past’ (Toadvine 
132). Reflection, in taking up nature, is dealing with something ontologically related to 
itself, but the reverse of this immanence is the transcendence, or inexhaustibility, that is 
also in reflection on nature, and it is this transcendence which preserves reflection from 
being tautological or identical to nature at every point. 
 
So far we have talked of nature as the unreflective, but the emergence of reflection on 
the unreflective, sentient meaning doubling back on itself to explore its history 
(sensible meaning), introduces a paradox. Our mode of access to nature is reflection. 
We bring the unreflective to light by applying reflection to it. However, if the way in 
which the unreflected is expressed is necessarily through reflection, then mediation is a 
condition for understanding nature, and direct access is impossible. This means, first, 
that at any given moment, the meaningful sensible of nature is flowing into the 
meaningful sentient of human life which is its expression, and, second, that the effort of 
the ‘doubling back’ of reflection to join itself to its originary source must always be 
incomplete. Reflection, through reflection, cannot seamlessly rejoin the unreflected that 
is its beginning.  
 
And yet, though a seamless rejoining is impossible, there is reversibility between 
reflection and the unreflective. Not only does nature flow into human reflection, but 
there is also a kind of doubling back again of reflection upon nature because in the act 
of reflecting we are seeking a kind of passage from sentient meaning back to sensible 
meaning: ‘We are looking for the primordial, non-lexical meaning always intended by 
people who speak of nature’ (Nature 3). Reflection, in trying to ‘return’ in this way, 
discloses a crucial moment in which lies the being of both reflection and nature. It 
moves through and in time, in order to circle back to nature, finding that:  
 
‘…this self-rending movement of expression is not a potentiality of the human 
subject so much as an event of nature itself, of its own duplicity, which entails 
that our “alienation” from nature, if this word has any sense, can only be a 
moment of nature’s own self-unfolding expression through us’ (Toadvine 132-
3). 
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This expression of nature, happening as it does in and through time, is historical. 
Reflection inescapably happens in history, is historical in its being, yet is also reversible 
back to the unreflective. Human thought and activity in history, even as it moves 
forwards and differentiates itself from nature, also seeks to re-enter that from which it 
came, to understand the secret of its originary meaning. The motivation for history 
begins in nature, in prehistory, and the continued movement of history receives its force 
from the effort to fold the sentient back over to meet and apprehend the sensible. One 
could understand natural scientific thought and technological advancement, for 
example, as thoroughly historical and reflective events which find their meaning and 
movement in their desire to plumb the depths of the unreflective (nature) that is their 
‘soil.’ Therefore, what happens between nature and history, the movement from one to 
the other which is constitutive and expressive of both – this movement is precisely that 
of crossing, is a chiasm.  
 
This analysis of nature and its meaning as the unreflected, or meaningful sensible, 
along with its passage into a reflection which is necessarily historical is sufficient to 
show that within a world structured by chiasm, it is a relation of chiasm that obtains 
between nature and history. Now it remains to work out the implications of this 
relationship for both nature and history, to see how this manner of thinking directs and 
bears fruit for philosophical thinking. There are many philosophical problems to which 
the above analysis applies, including the problem of how to define nature and the 
meaning of the ways in which the Western tradition has struggled to fashion such a 
definition. However, the one problem I will focus on is a historical one. I will trace a 
question which was important in neo-Kantian German thought, next examined in 
Husserl, and finally taken up by Merleau-Ponty in the working notes of The Visible and 
the Invisible. This is the problem of the study of history possessing scientific validity 
while not needing to operate in a way that is methodologically parallel to the natural 
sciences.  
 
I will begin with the neo-Kantian Wilhelm Dilthey’s work on this problem. Dilthey saw 
history (and the human sciences in general) as directed toward capturing important 
moments in the flow of the ‘nexus of life’ [Lebenszusammenhang], by which he meant 
a web-like continuity between nature and psychic life. Due to the fleeting nature of 
experience, the human sciences are tasked with working to relate human life back to 
this nexus, ‘back to a creative, evaluative, and active source, something that expresses 
and objectifies itself’ (Dilthey 109). Their goal is to come to an understanding of the 
invisible contours of life from within. Dilthey wants the human sciences to be 
scientific, but recognizes that because their orientation is different from the orientation 
of the natural sciences, and so must their method be. Rather than beginning from a 
hypothetical basis as do the natural sciences, the human sciences as Dilthey understands 
them must begin and remain rooted in lived experience [Erlebnis]. Their efforts to 
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study the nexus of life will not be successful if they postulate for theoretical purposes a 
discontinuity between the psychical and the physical as the natural sciences do. This is 
because there is no experiential basis for seeing such discontinuity in the nexus of life. 
A study that begins from this abstraction already distances itself from the nexus of life 
and will not be able to get at the real object of its inquiry. However, this condition 
introduces a tension which Dilthey does not resolve. How can the human sciences be 
scientific when carried out by historical persons who purposely begin from their own 
lived experiences which are determined by their own particular historical horizons? In 
the paradigm which he creates, Dilthey’s own philosophical and historical assertions 
are merely expressions of life which have their place amongst the interconnected 
systems that form the socio-historical nexus but do not constitute an Archimedean point 
from which to make universal statements about the essence of the human sciences. 
 
Husserl, in reading Dilthey, paid close attention to this problem and attempted to move 
beyond it in formulating his own philosophy of history in The Crisis and in his essay 
‘The Origin of Geometry.’ In these works, the solution to the dilemma of the 
scientificity of the human sciences (especially history) is that reflection upon these 
sciences discloses an a priori structure always already operating in our experience of 
and reflection on history. ‘The historical horizon…has its essential structure that can be 
revealed through methodological inquiry’ (Husserl 369). What this structure consists of 
is bound up in Husserl’s metaphor of sedimentation, a metaphor that Merleau-Ponty 
continues to make use of in The Visible and the Invisible. He tells us that ‘history is 
from the start nothing other than the vital movement of the coexistence and the 
interweavings of original formations and sedimentations of meaning’ (Husserl 371).  
 
‘The Origin of Geometry’ leaves the structure of history undefined and unexplored, 
however, and in the end, Husserl’s contention that reflection upon history can uncover 
the a priori structure of history is still susceptible to a critique. The trouble is not that 
there is no a priori structure to discover; Husserl has given us an account of structure 
that moves us beyond the formulation of the issue in Dilthey. However, it is still 
difficult to see how reflection is equipped to discover this structure. The essence of 
reflection is mediation. How then can reflection penetrate back through sedimented 
layers of meaning to disclose the structure of history? Reflection must add more and 
more layers to history in its attempts to double back and access the structure of what 
lies beneath it. In other words, the tension that emerges here is the same tension that 
characterizes the chiasm between reflection and the unreflective.  
 
Merleau-Ponty has this difficulty in mind in his discussion of history and philosophy in 
the working notes to The Visible and the Invisible. His idea for moving forward relies 
on the chiasm between nature and history. He formulates the problem by talking about 
the history of philosophy and asking if it is necessary to distinguish between the views 
that past philosophers took of their own problems and the ways in which we understand 
Res Cogitans (2011) 2                                                                                                          Kovaka | 234 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
their problems in retrospect. Can there be continuity in philosophy if we understand the 
questions of past philosophers differently than they understood them? His answer is, 
‘Not if the philosophies in their integrality are a question, the interrogative thought 
which makes them speak is not overcome by what comes later’ (199). We can trace the 
structural development of something like philosophy through time if there is a 
questioning moving through philosophy at all times which allows thinking at a later 
time to be faithful to the projects and problems of previous times.  
 
‘There is but one solution: show that there is transcendence, to be sure, between  
the philosophies, not reduction to one unique plane, but that, in this plane, 
staggered out in depth, they nevertheless refer to one another, it is nevertheless a 
question of the same Being – show between the philosophies a perceptual 
relation or relation of transcendence. Hence, a vertical history, which has its 
rights along the “objective” history of philosophy…’ (VI 185-6). 
 
This idea of continuity of questioning through time is similar in structure to the passing 
of the sensible meaning into sentient meaning – the logic of chiasm permeates them 
both. Nature has doubled over itself to produce history, and the process of history is a 
continuation of this doubling over in order to move forward. I said before that the 
movement from nature to history is reversible, that the march of history finds its 
motivation in its desire to re-enter the mute sensible which generated it. So, consistency 
to the logic of the chiasm requires not only a continuity of questioning through time, 
but that this continuity also be a folding back over which seeks to complete the circle of 
its reflection, all the while finding that a certain failure, or alienation, is the very 
condition for its being. This is, in fact, the next step Merleau-Ponty takes in his notes.  
 
He works to show that a structural philosophy of history such as he is outlining must 
circle back to nature, and that the crossing of history and nature is what resolves the 
problems which both Dilthey and Husserl deal with in their works. Near the very end of 
the notes for The Visible and the Invisible he talks about a philosophical account of 
history as a philosophy of structure, one which may be better understood in terms of 
geography than in terms of history: 
 
‘Whereas geography – or rather: the Earth as Ur-Arche brings to light the carnal 
Urhistorie (Husserl – Umsurtz…) In fact it is a question of grasping the nexus – 
neither “historical” nor “geographic” of history and transcendental geology, this 
very time that is space, this very space that is time, which I will have 
rediscovered by my analysis of the visible and the flesh, the simultaneous 
Urstiftung of time and space which makes there be a historical landscape and a 
quasi-geographical inscription of history. Fundamental problem: the 
sedimentation and the reactivation’ (VI 258). 
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Here Merleau-Ponty references Husserl’s concepts of sedimentation and reactivation 
which are so important to ‘The Origin of Geometry.’ How this sedimentation and 
reactivation occurs, how understanding is possible (epistemology), must be grappled 
with within the context of an ontology which apprehends being in terms of crossing, or 
movement between. When the being of time and space, or history and the natural 
world, is found in the moment of their crossing, then there can be a structural 
philosophy (Husserl’s goal) that begins to make out the landscape it is traversing, all 
the while recognizing the truth of alienation, or differentiation, or reversibility as a 
constraint on and condition for any reflection.  
 
The way to come to this point is, as Merleau-Ponty pointed out in his lecture course on 
Nature, to begin with the ontology of nature, because it discloses the chiasm between 
the reflected and unreflective, both pointing the way to the fundamental notion of 
reversibility and showing that history, too, is incorporated into this pattern of relation 
by being that which nature touches, that into which it flows, the condition of nature’s 
expression. The crossing of space and time is fundamental and a faithful thinking 
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